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CHAPTER 1 
1. INTRODUCTION 
The legal concept of dolus eventualis is a fundamental principle in South African criminal law1 
but the definition and application of dolus eventualis is subject to controversy2 and criticism by 
legal scholars.3 There is much vacillation surrounding the definition and application of the concept, 
which has led to legal uncertainty throughout its development.4 It is submitted that despite the 
controversy surrounding dolus eventualis, it rightfully remains a firmly rooted form of intention 
in South African criminal law.5 The principle of intention is of paramount importance to South 
African criminal law, as South Africa subscribes to the actus non facit reum nisi mens sit rea 
maxim.6 
This dissertation focuses exclusively on intention in the form of dolus eventualis. Other forms of 
intention such as dolus directus, dolus indirectus, dolus generalis and dolus indeterminatus will 
not be discussed as they fall outside the scope of this study. 
The aim and purpose of this dissertation is to evaluate the application of dolus eventualis with 
specific reference to fatalities caused on our roads by the drivers of motor vehicles involved in 
motor vehicle collisions. The rationale of this study stems from the judgment of the Supreme Court 
of Appeal in S v Humphreys.7 The accused in Humphreys had driven a mini-bus through an active 
railway crossing despite the warning of the arrival of a nearby oncoming train. The mini-bus 
collided with the train. Although the accused had survived the collision, ten passengers died and 
four were severely injured.8 As a result, the accused had been charged and convicted on ten counts 
of murder and four counts of attempted murder. On appeal to the Supreme Court of Appeal, the 
court found the accused guilty of culpable homicide for the death of the ten deceased passengers 
                                                          
1 A Paizes. ‘Dolus eventualis reconsidered’ (1988) 105 SALJ 636, 636. 
2 R Whiting ‘Thoughts on dolus eventualis’ (1988) 3 SACJ 440, 440. 
3 MM Loubser & MA Rabie ‘Defining dolus eventualis: a voluntative element?’ (1988) 3 SACJ 415, 415. 
4 Paizes (see note 1) 636. 
5 S v Coetzee and Others 1997 (1) SACR 379 (CC) para 177 A. 
6 Ibid para 162; JM Burchell Principles of Criminal Law 5ed (2016) 60: An act is not unlawful unless there 
   is a guilty mind 
7 S v Humphreys 2013 (2) SACR 1 (SCA). 
8 Ibid 1. 
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and the four charges of attempted murder were set aside,9 as he was found to have acted 
negligently.10 
An important question to ask is, why does the National Prosecuting Authority pursue charges of 
murder in cases where fatalities arise from motor vehicle collisions? At face value these fatalities 
are accidental or as a result of negligent conduct. Although it is respectfully acknowledged that 
the trauma caused to the victims of these incidents is truly horrific, is it legally correct to find that 
the accused had had the intention to kill under these circumstances?  
Based on the legal principle of dolus eventualis, is there any merit in charging an accused with 
murder for causing fatalities from a motor vehicle collision? May our courts correctly find an 
accused guilty of murder under these circumstances or is it a futile exercise by the National 
Prosecuting Authority to bring charges of murder? 
The crime of murder is a serious offence and should be placed upon those who legally deserve the 
conviction. Arguably, finding ordinary drivers of motor vehicles to harbor murderous intention in 
road collision circumstances may undermine the seriousness of the offence. 
It is submitted that the state may be blinded by the high frequency of road fatalities when pursuing 
charges of murder in these scenarios.11 The fight in support of reducing road accident fatalities 
tampers with the legal principle of dolus eventualis, as the state may feel pressured to institute 
charges of murder for deaths resulting from vehicle collisions as a means to deter drivers from 
driving dangerously.12 Charges of culpable homicide would seem more appropriate in these 
circumstances. 
It is by no means submitted that dolus eventualis cannot find application in fatalities arising from 
motor vehicle collisions. In fact, it may apply. However, it is submitted that its application in the 
context of motor vehicle collisions requires further scrutiny. 
                                                          
9 Ibid 28. 
10 Ibid 20; R v Steenkamp 1960 3 SA 680 (N) 684; CR Snyman Criminal Law 6ed (2014) 452: The convictions of 
attempted murder were set aside because there is no crime in our law of negligent assault. 
11 Minister of Transport of South Africa, MS Dipuo Peters, Address at the occasion of the Africa Road Safety, 31 
October 2016 at Tsogo Sun Elangeni Hotel, Durban, South Africa.  
12 Ibid. 
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Dolus eventualis is a legally technical and academically complex concept to understand and apply. 
These complexities arise from the subjective nature of this legal concept, which is proved by means 
of inferential reasoning.13 It is submitted that these technicalities and complexities become more 
challenging when dolus eventualis is applied to fatalities caused by drivers of motor vehicles.  
This dissertation seeks to clarify the way in which the legal test for dolus eventualis ought to apply 
with regard to motor vehicle collisions. This will be achieved through an evaluation of the 
application of dolus eventualis in the decision of S v Humphreys.14 A foundational understanding 
of the concept of dolus eventualis and the controversy surrounding it are therefore essential before 
engaging in its application to motor vehicle collisions. 
Consequently, this study will first deal with such foundational knowledge and controversy and 
then seek to ascertain whether it would be appropriate for the National Prosecuting Authority to 
charge accused persons with murder based on intention in the form of dolus eventualis for fatalities 
resulting from motor vehicle collisions.  
In light of the Humphreys judgment, it is submitted that the legal distinction between dolus 
eventualis and luxuria is of fundamental importance, as it may provide clarity on the application 
of dolus eventualis in the context of fatalities caused by motor vehicle collisions. These legal 
concepts are closely related and characteristically overlap with each other. They will be discussed 
separately in chapter 2. 
It is submitted that the research methodology adopted for this research is consistent with an 
analytical doctrinal research approach, which is also known as legal positivism research theory. 
1.1 The development of dolus eventualis 
The legal concept of dolus eventualis is now a firmly rooted principle in South African criminal 
law.15 It was only after 1945 that this legal concept began to establish its true authority on the 
South African law of intention.16 A brief examination of the way in which this fundamental 
principle infiltrated our law is necessary to understand the importance of its modern day presence. 
                                                          
13 Snyman (see note 10) 184 - 186. 
14 S v Humphreys (see note 7). 
15 S v Coetzee 1997 (3) SA 527 (CC) para 177. Burchell (see note 6) 355 - 356. 
16 Burchell (see note 6) 355 - 356. 
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Intention in the form of dolus directus is the simplest form of intention to understand, as it 
describes intention in its ordinary grammatical sense.17 However, as early as the 13th century, Saint 
Thomas Aquinas (Aquinas) analysed a form of intention where the crime committed was not part 
of the goal of the perpetrator but occurred as a consequence of the perpetrator’s intended act.18 The 
reasoning adopted by Aquinas to rely on this form of intention was based on the principle of cause 
and effect, which states that an effect is intended by the perpetrator if the effect ordinarily or 
naturally flows from that act.19 It was Aquinas's submission that a person intends the natural and 
ordinary consequences of their act.20 Legal commentators have since built on this reasoning.21 
In the 16th century Covarruvias adopted the theory advanced by Aquinas but it differed materially 
in the scope of its application.22 Covarruvias claimed that any consequence of an intended act is 
deemed to be intentional irrespective of whether or not such a consequence is an ordinary or natural 
consequence of such act.23 By implication of his reasoning, foresight of the consequence is not 
necessary to prove intent and only the act needs to be intentional.24 He referred to this concept of 
intention as voluntas indirecta.25 
Carpzovius, who was influential amongst the Roman-Dutch writers, holds a significant role in the 
law of intent, as he is deemed to have concocted a concept of intention that is implied by the 
perpetrator’s conduct rather than the perpetrator’s actual will.26 He was responsible for carrying 
the doctrine of voluntas indirecta over into German law, which was interpreted by German 
scholars as dolus indirectus.27 
                                                          
17 Ibid 350. 
18 Focus ‘Dolus eventualis’ 1988 SACJ 413.  
19 S Hoctor ‘The Concept of Dolus Eventualis in South African Law - An Historical Perspective’ (2008) 14 
Fundamina 14, 16. 
20 Ibid 16. 
21 Ibid 16. 
22 Ibid 16. 
23 Ibid 16. 
24 Ibid 16. 
25 Ibid 16. 
26 HDJ Bodenstein ‘Phases in the development of criminal mens reas’ 1920 SALJ 21. (Part 2 of article). 
27 Hoctor (see note 19) 16. 
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The contributions of Carpzovius are without doubt paramount to the development of the law of 
intention. However, German scholar Bodenstein is of the opinion that fellow German scholar 
Boemher was the first to discover dolus indirectus, in the 18thcentury.28 
It is thus clear that the writings of legal scholars depict discussions of a form of intention other 
than dolus directus, well before the South African courts gave consideration to their discussions.29 
In 1920 Bodenstein recognised three forms of intent in criminal law: dolus directus; dolus 
indirectus and dolus eventualis.30 Bodenstein defined dolus eventualis as:  
‘The effect caused by the willful act or inaction is foreseen as a possible consequence, the 
agent, however neither wishes it nor aims at it.31 Bodenstein described the mental state of 
dolus eventualis as follows: Whenever the agent had beforehand consented to or approved 
of the effect; when the agent is so keen on the effect that he is prepared to take into the 
bargain, if need be, the undesired effects, or when the fact that he foresaw the effect as 
something certain to ensue would not have caused him to abstain from action; when the 
agent comes to the conclusion that if the undesired effect ensues that he is also game with 
it; or despite foreseeing the undesired effect still proceeds to act with the risk in mind; to 
proceed whether it will ensue or not.’32 
From examining the descriptions provided by Bodenstein of the mental state of the perpetrator, it 
may be concluded that the focus is on the subjective nature or state of the mind.  
In 1937 Coertze approved of Bodenstein’s views and he appears to be the first South African jurist 
to adopt the Afrikaans translation of dolus eventualis.33 
Gie includes the doctrine of dolus eventualis in his interpretation of intention. However, his version 
of dolus eventualis differs, as it does not contain a volitional element, only a foresight element.34 
Gie states that dolus eventualis did not exist at the time in our courts because of the application of 
                                                          
28 Bodenstein (see note 26) 22.  
29 Hoctor (see note 19) 17. 
30 Ibid 17. 
31 Ibid 17. 
32 Ibid 17. 
33 Ibid 18. 
34 Ibid 19. Dolus eventualis is considered to consist of two elements: a foresight element and a volitional element. 
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the presumption that the accused must have intended the natural and probable consequences of his 
act.35 
Gardiner and Lansdown was a dominant source of South African criminal law from about 1931 
until the intervention of Strafreg by JC de Wet in 1949.36 Bodenstein and Coertze’s theoretical 
descriptions of dolus eventualis were not incorporated into South African law in Gardiner and 
Lansdown.37 
Gardiner and Lansdown makes reference to a type of intention that may be described as the closest 
approximation of dolus eventualis.38 It is stated as:  
‘Mens rea in a less and mediate degree is found in those cases which an offender, without 
specific malice or intention directed to the crime charged, consciously sets forth upon a 
wrongful or unlawful design, and in the execution of it reaches a criminal result greater, 
short of, or otherwise different from that proposed, but which he should reasonably have 
contemplated as a possible consequence of his conduct.’39 
This description was considered as a lesser form of intention40 and is closely linked to the English 
law presumption that a person intends the natural and ordinary consequences of his actions.41 
This English law presumption was followed for many years in the South African courts.42 
Applying the presumption that a person intends the natural and ordinary consequences of their acts 
has been subject to criticism by legal scholars. Intention is meant to be assessed subjectively and 
the accused is meant to foresee the consequence of his act to be legally liable.43 The use of the 
presumption creates an issue in both its form and language. It is submitted that presuming intention 
certainly strikes a blow to the actus non facit reum nisi mens sit rea maxim, and the state should 
not be assisted with a presumption of intent.  
                                                          
35 Ibid 19. 
36 Digby Sqhelo Koyana ‘The Influence of the Native Territories Penal Code on South African Criminal Law’ 
unpublished PhD thesis, University of South Africa, 1988, 2. 
37 Hoctor (see note 19) 18. 
38 Ibid 18. 
39 Ibid 18. 
40 Ibid 18. 
41 Ibid 18. 
42 R v Jolly 1923 AD 176: 186; R v Jongani 1937 AD 400: 406; R v Longone 1938 AD 532: 539; Burchell (see note 
6) 355.  
43 Hoctor (see note 19) 19. 
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The presumption also inherently, by its language, applies an objective assessment in determining 
intention, which is a subjective inquiry. However, this objective assessment of intention has been 
applied by our courts.44 It measures the accused's conduct against a reasonable person in the same 
circumstances.45 The use of the phrases: "naturally flowing from," "ordinarily," or "reasonably 
contemplated" refer to an objectively viewed state of affairs. The consequence is detached from 
the perpetrator’s intention and is rather linked to an objectively determined expectation. The 
question asked is whether or not the accused ought to have foreseen the harm or should the accused 
have foreseen the harm? The use of the words "ought" or "should" measure the accused's conduct 
against that of a reasonable person, or applies a yardstick approach in determining intention.46 This 
type of language must be avoided, as it entails an inquiry pertaining to negligence rather than 
intention because of its objective approach.47 The question instead should be "did the accused 
subjectively foresee the harm?" 48 
It is submitted that the language used by the presumption of intention, namely the words "naturally 
flowing from" and "ordinarily" are ambiguous. It is submitted that these phrases may lead to two 
possible interpretations, the first being the objective interpretation as discussed above and the 
second being a more subjective interpretation. If the words are used to imply consequences that 
flow from the accused's act as a result of normal human experience, it is then submitted that that 
interpretation strays away from comparing the accused's act to a reasonable person and rather 
becomes an inference of logic and reason.49 
The use of the presumption was justified by the reasoning that it is impossible to examine the mind 
of the accused and the law therefore presumes his intent from his actions.50 In support of the 
                                                          
44 R v Jolly (see note 42) 186; R v Jongani (see note 42) 406; R v Longone (see note 42) 539; Hoctor (see note 19) 
19. 
45 Hoctor (see note 19) 19. 
46 P Carstens ‘Revisiting the relationship between dolus eventualis and luxuria in the context of vehicular collisions 
causing the death of fellow passengers and/or pedestrians: S v Humphreys 2013 (2) SACR 1 (SCA)’ (2013) SACJ 
1 68.  
47 Ibid 68 - 69. 
48 Ibid 68. 
49 Snyman (see note 10) 185. 
50 Hoctor (see note 19) 19 - 20. Pain ‘Some reflections on our criminal law’ 1960 Acta Juridica 297: fn 69. 
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presumption, it was put forth that the courts relying on the presumption of intention was dependent 
on the facts and evidence51 of the case and that the presumption could be rebutted by the accused.52 
The issue with the presumption doctrine is that it assesses intention with an objective test, which 
has the effect of blurring the distinction between intention and negligence.53 
Glanville Williams is of the opinion that the presumption is unsatisfactory and distorts the line 
between intention and negligence.54The presumption masquerades as an inquiry for intention but 
is in fact using an objective assessment to determine a subjective inquiry.55 In short, the 
presumption applies the test for negligence but refers to it as intention. 
Swanepoel raises the following important issue: consider the situation where the accused did not 
foresee the consequence of his actions at all. Should he be deemed to have had intention based on 
a reasonable person standard?56 
Morkel submits that if such a presumption is followed then the state needs only to prove that the 
act was intended because the culpability of the accused will be implied from the act.57 This creates 
the view that the presumption is an adoption of the versari in re illicita doctrine in disguise.58 If 
this view is accepted then the presumption should be struck down on the same basis as the versari 
in re illicita doctrine was by the Appellate Division.59 The state should not be assisted by a 
presumption of intent and must bear the burden of proving all the elements of the crime.60 
R v Ndhlovu61 may be considered as a turning point in our law in which South African courts began 
to shift from an objective approach to intention to a more subjective approach.62 There is no doubt 
that the introduction of Strafreg by J.C de Wet has fundamentally developed criminal law. The 
views of the German and Roman-Dutch writers for the abolition of the presumption doctrine and 
                                                          
51 Hoctor (see note 19) 20.  
52 Hoctor (see note 19) 20. R v Jolly (see note 44) 181, 189. 
53 Hoctor (see note 19) 21.   
54 Ibid 20 - 21.  
55 Hoctor (see note 19) 20. 
56 Hoctor (see note 19) 21. 
57 Ibid 21. 
58 Ibid 21. 
59 S v Mescht 1962 (1) SA 521 (A); S v Bernardus 1965 (3) SA 287 (A). 
60 R v Ndhlovu 1945 AD 369: 386. 
61 Ibid 386. 
62 Hoctor (see note 19) 22. 
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the use of a more subjective approach to intention had become more compelling to the South 
African courts.63 
Characteristics of dolus eventualis appear to have always been present in the application of the 
law. However, only after 1945 did this form of intention truly infiltrate our courts.64 Earlier South 
African case law indicates acceptance and the application of dolus eventualis.65 
Holmes in S v De Bruyn said that the purest form of dolus eventualis was illustrated in S v 
Malinga.66 Dolus eventualis was described as follows in Malinga: 
‘In considering the issue of intention to kill, the test is whether the socius foresaw the 
possibility that the act in question in the prosecution of the common purpose would have 
fatal consequence, and was reckless whether death resulted or not.’67 
There is no doubt that dolus eventualis forms part of South African criminal law. However, despite 
its firm presence in our law it remains subject to criticism and controversy regarding its meaning 
and application. This is discussed in chapter 2. 
1.2  The constitutionality of dolus eventualis 
It is respectfully submitted that the form of mens rea used by Gardiner and Landsdown and the 
presumption that a person intends the ordinary or natural consequences of their actions would not 
survive our modern constitutional scrutiny. The very presumption that it creates offends the 
autonomy of an individual, which in turn offends the dignity of that individual and is in conflict 
with the subjective approach to criminal intent in South African law.68 In S v Coetzee the 
Constitutional Court held that dolus eventualis is a sufficient form of culpability in our law.69 
 
 
                                                          
63 Ibid 22.  
64 Burchell see (note 6) 355 - 356. 
65 R v Valachia 1945 AD 826; R v Horn 1958 (3) SA 457 (A). 
66 S v De Bruyn 1968 (4) SA 498 (A) 509 H. 
67 S v Malinga 1963 (1) SA 692 (A) 694 G-H. 
68 Hoctor ‘Dignity, The Criminal Law, and The Bill of Rights’ (2004) SALJ 304, 306 - 307. 
69 S v Coetzee 1997 (3) SA 527 (CC) para 177. 
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1.3 Conclusion 
Dolus eventualis is a well-established principle in South African criminal law. As discussed above, 
dolus eventualis has developed progressively since the 13th century. The manner in which dolus 
eventualis portrays itself in the 21st century certainly respects the integrity of our constitutional 
principles and criminal law, as it regards people as autonomous beings. 
Chapter 2 focuses on the principle of dolus eventualis as it is known and applied by our courts to 
date. In addition to the discussion of dolus eventualis, chapter 2 discusses the principle of luxuria.  
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CHAPTER 2 
2. DOLUS EVENTUALIS AND LUXURIA 
2.1 Introduction 
As illustrated in chapter 1, the doctrine of dolus eventualis has developed significantly through 
various interpretations and legal systems. It is however submitted that the doctrine of dolus 
eventualis will always be difficult to define because of its inherently subjective nature. Definitions 
and descriptions of dolus eventualis may differ amongst legal scholars but despite such differences 
the definitions all retain the essential characteristics of the doctrine, which are that: (i) dolus 
eventualis is assessed subjectively and (ii) it consists of two components: a foresight component 
(cognitive) and a volitional component (conative).70 
A number of authors express the view that dolus eventualis should only consist of a foresight 
component (cognitive).71 However, it is submitted that this is not the view adopted by our courts.72 
A discussion of this difference in opinions is presented further on in this chapter. 
2.2 The definition of dolus eventualis 
It is submitted that the definition of dolus eventualis offered by Snyman is the least controversial 
description in terms of the terminology used.73 Snyman defines dolus eventualis as presented 
below. 
A person commits a crime with intention in the form of dolus eventualis if the commission of the 
unlawful act or the causing of the unlawful result is not his main aim, but: 
a) he subjectively foresees the possibility that, in striving towards his main aim, the unlawful 
act may be committed, or the unlawful result may be caused (cognitive element) and 
b) he reconciles himself to this possibility (conative element).74 
                                                          
70 Burchell (see note 6) 357 - 358; Snyman (see note 10) 178. Both these authors differ in definition. 
71 Paizes (see note 1) 638: comments that the conative element is a notion without utility; Whiting (see note 2) 446. 
72 Humphreys (see note 7) para 12. The court expressly described dolus eventualis as a two part test. 
73 S Hoctor ‘The degree of foresight in dolus eventualis’ (2013) 2 SACJ 146. 
74 Snyman (see note 10) 178. 
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Consider the following illustration that depicts the operation of the doctrine of dolus eventualis:75 
Person X is standing on a bridge above a freeway and throws a brick downwards onto the freeway 
that is full of fast moving vehicles. Person X foresees that the brick may or may not cause damage 
to a vehicle. He still wishes to throw the brick, not caring whether or not it could cause damage. If 
the brick does cause damage to a vehicle, Person X would have had intention in the form of dolus 
eventualis.  
Also consider the following, which is a more practical situation in which dolus eventualis is 
applied.76 
Person Z brutally assaults person Y with a cricket bat by striking him on the head multiple times. 
Person Y dies as a result of the assault. Person Z knew that the manner in which he attacked person 
Y could kill him but he nevertheless continued to act, indifferent to the possibility of death 
occurring. Person Z cannot submit that he only had intention to assault person Y as a defense to 
murder. Person Z displayed intention in the form of dolus eventualis to kill person Y. 
What may be ascertained from these illustrations is that the person performing the unlawful act 
does not need to have the direct intention to cause a specific result but is rather held liable for 
having the requisite foresight or knowledge that the unlawful result may occur. 
2.3 Dolus eventualis and inferential reasoning 
South African criminal law assesses intention subjectively, which means that the courts are tasked 
with assessing the actual state of mind of the accused during the commission of the crime. Proving 
intention in a court of law is therefore a difficult task and the evidential burden placed on the state 
is onerous. It is rare, if not impossible, to find direct evidence of intention. Direct evidence will 
only exist in circumstances in which the accused confesses to having intention or implies during 
his testimony that he had intention to commit the crime.77 Relying solely on this type of evidence 
to prove intention would bring the legal system into disrepute on the basis that our criminal justice 
system will be dependent on the accused's version of events in order to prove the element of 
intention. This would amount to a rather unsatisfactory situation because the court would only be 
                                                          
75 Ibid 179. 
76 Ibid 179. 
77 Ibid 184 - 185. 
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able to hear direct evidence supplied by the accused, which may be untrue and biased in favour of 
the accused. The onus on state to prove intention would become extremely difficult, if only direct 
evidence could be submitted to the court.  
The courts rely on indirect evidence by using the process of inferential reasoning to determine the 
accused’s subjective state of mind.78 Based on the accused’s outward conduct during the 
commission of the crime and the circumstances surrounding the situation, the court would be in a 
position to infer whether or not the accused had intent.79 
The courts must avoid applying an objective test or objective standards when assessing intent. In 
all circumstances the court must avoid adopting an armchair reasoning approach and refrain from 
comparing the accused to a reasonable person in the same circumstances.80 
The role of the court is to determine the actual state of mind of the accused at the time of the 
commission of the crime. The court must therefore consider all the circumstances surrounding the 
crime. A fine line exists between using common human experience and general knowledge to 
determine intent and between using a reasonable person standard.81 The courts must attempt to 
place themselves in the position of the accused at the time of the incident and must guard against 
ex post facto knowledge.82 
Language is a crucial factor when determining intention by inferential reasoning. In some 
instances, the courts have used the words "should" or "ought" when describing intention 
(specifically the cognitive element). By expressing that "the accused should have or ought to have 
foreseen the possibility" the court is engaging in a comparison of the accused's conduct to that of 
a reasonable person and is effectively applying the objective test for negligence rather than the 
subjective test for intention.83 
Another word that has been used by our courts that is subject to ambiguity is the use of the word 
"must" to describe the cognitive element.84 The word “must” may be interpreted in two ways. The 
                                                          
78 Ibid 185. 
79 Ibid 185. 
80 Ibid 185; S v De Bruyn (see note 66) 507 D. 
81 Snyman (see note 10) 184 - 186. 
82 Ibid 185 - 186; S v Mini 1963 (3) SA 188 (A) 196 E. 
83 Snyman (see note 10) 186. 
84 Ibid 185 - 186. 
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first interpretation the court may express is that the word "must" makes reference to what the 
accused should have foreseen.85 The second interpretation that the court may express from the 
word "must" is that the accused did, in fact, foresee.86 The former interpretation implies an 
objective test and the latter, a subjective test.87 The context in which the word "must" is used is 
therefore important when distinguishing between objective and subjective tests. 88 
The courts have also warned of too readily drawing the inference of subjective foresight. The jump 
from “ought to have foreseen” to “did foresee” must not be made too easily.89 All the thought 
processes of the accused must be established beyond a reasonable doubt and the specific 
circumstances surrounding the crime must be considered before reaching the conclusion of 
subjective intention.90 
The degree of proof in determining subjective foresight by inferential reasoning was laid out in S 
v Sigwahla as:  
‘Subjective foresight, like any other factual issue, may be proved by inference. To 
constitute proof beyond reasonable doubt the inference must be the only one which can 
reasonably be drawn. It cannot be so drawn if there is a reasonable possibility that 
subjectively the accused did not foresee, even if he ought reasonably to have done so, and 
even if he probably did do so.’ 91 
Inferential reasoning is a powerful and useful tool in determining intention. However, the courts 
must use this tool with the caution and grammatical precision it requires. The line between 
negligence and intention has the potential to become blurred if not approached with caution. The 
effect of applying an objective assessment to a subjective inquiry will blur the line between 
negligence and intention. Using the words "should have" and "ought" when determining the 
cognitive element of dolus eventualis may lead to the court presuming intention based on a 
reasonable person standard. As illustrated in chapter 1, this line of deductive reasoning and 
                                                          
85 Ibid 185 - 186. 
86 S v Majosi 1991 2 SACR 532 (A) 538 E; S v De Oliveira 1993 2 SACR 59 (A) 65 I-J. 
87 Snyman (see note 10) 186. 
88 Ibid 186. 
89 S v Dube 2010 (1) SACR 65 (KZP) para 20. 
90 S v Mini (see note 82) 196 C-H. 
91 S v Sigwahla 1967 (4) SA 566 (A) 570 E. 
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presumption is subject to criticism and not always consistent with the psychological approach to 
crime. 
It is submitted that courts will inevitably use facts to draw inferences. There remains a crucial 
difference in the use of objective facts to aid in the process of drawing inferences and the use of 
objective criteria to determine intention.92 The latter will result in a test for negligence and the 
former is a line of reasoning supported by logic and normal human experience.93 
2.4 The cognitive element of dolus eventualis 
Dolus eventualisis now discussed in terms of its constituent parts, beginning with the cognitive 
element.  
The cognitive element of dolus eventualis may also be referred to as the foresight element.94 This 
element of the definition requires the accused to subjectively foresee the possibility that his 
conduct may cause the unlawful result.95 The academic debate surrounding the cognitive element 
pertains to the scope of foresight required to satisfy the cognitive element.96 The crucial question 
is whether the foresight of the unlawful result should be defined in qualified or unqualified terms.97 
First, foresight defined in unqualified terms will be examined followed by foresight defined in 
qualified terms.  
2.5 Foresight defined in unqualified terms 
It is an established norm that the cognitive element of dolus eventualis requires the accused to have 
subjectively foreseen the unlawful result.98 However, to what extent is such foresight applicable 
to criminal liability?99 
Defining foresight in unqualified terms requires that the accused foresaw the possibility of the 
unlawful result occurring irrespective of how remote or slight that possibility may have been.100 
                                                          
92 Snyman (see note 10) 185 - 186. 
93 Ibid 185 - 186. 
94 Snyman (see note 10) 180. 
95 Ibid 179 - 180. 
96 Hoctor (see note 73) 131.  
97 Ibid 131.  
98 Snyman (see note 10) 179 - 180.  
99 Burchell (see note 6) 362. 
100 Hoctor (see note 73) 136 - 137. 
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The word possibility is imperative when expressed in unqualified terms and not supported by any 
adjectives relating to its scope of application. The term “possibility” breeds a particular 
interpretation.101 The degree or extent of such a possibility materialising has no bearing on the 
subjective foresight of the accused.  
The essential characteristic of unqualified foresight is that the foresight of the unlawful possibility 
must have been present in the mind of the accused even though the foreseen possibility may have 
been unlikely or improbable. If the accused foresaw the result in his own mind then the accused 
satisfies the cognitive element of dolus eventualis.102 
By means of an illustration: 
Assume person X subjectively foresees the possibility that he may cause the death of person Z if 
he engages in a certain type of conduct. However, he considers the chances of the death actually 
occurring as a rarity. The chances of death occurring may be highly unlikely, but person X still 
foresees that it may possibly occur. If person X acts and does in fact cause the death of person Z, 
he will then satisfy the cognitive element of dolus eventualis on the basis that he foresaw the 
possibility103 of causing the death of person Z. 
2.5.1 Case law in support of unqualified foresight 
South African courts have supported the view that the cognitive element of dolus eventualis should 
be defined in unqualified terms. One of the earliest cases that touched on the issue of the degree 
of foresight was R v Thibani, in which Schreiner stated the following:  
‘It seems to me to be clear that a man may have the intention to kill even though he does 
not visualise death as more likely than not to result from his acts. Supposing for instance 
that he was expressly warned at the time of the danger of death resulting from his act and, 
while realising that there was such danger, nevertheless did the act, reckless whether death 
resulted or not, I do not think that it would matter whether he thought that death would 
very probably result or whether he thought that, though reasonably possible, it would very 
probably not result ... I shall add that provided the requisite recklessness is present it may 
even be correct to say that realisation of the possibility of death resulting, even as a remote 
                                                          
101 Snyman (see note 10) 180. 
102 R v Thibani 1949 (4) SA 720 (A) 729 - 730. Schreiner JA comments (personal adaptation). 
103 Own emphasis added to indicate the importance of the word possibility defined in unqualified terms. 
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chance, would suffice, though it is not necessary for present purposes to go to that 
length.’104 
In R v Huebsch the term 'some risk of life' was used to describe the foresight element of dolus 
eventualis.105 The use of the word 'some' does not make reference to the extent of the risk that must 
exist but rather to the fact that there is at least a risk present. 
Schreiner JA held in R v Nsele that:  
‘... the risk must have been, and, therefore, by inference was, present to the mind of the 
accused, and provided that he was reckless whether or not it matured in death, I do not 
think that the seriousness of the risk is material.’106 
In Thibani, Huebsch and Nsele the indication of foresight being defined in unqualified terms was 
certainly expressed. The required degree of foresight was authoritatively laid down in R v Horn, 
when Beyers JA held:  
‘No doubt, an accused may, in appropriate circumstances, be heard to say “That which has 
happened was so improbable that I did not appreciate that there was a risk of it happening.” 
But that is not to say that a person who does foresee a risk of death is entitled, because the 
risk is slight, to 'take a chance' and, as it were, gamble with the life of another.’107 
Van Blerk JA in R v Horn agreed with his learned colleague that foresight should be expressed in 
unqualified terms. Van Blerk JA made reference to the earlier case of R v Huebsch and said: 
‘According to some decided cases death should have been a likely result of the act pursued 
by the wrongdoer ... Bodenstein ... refers only to the result foreseen as a possibility. This 
seems also to be what Schreiner JA conveyed in Rex v Huebsch, 1953 (2) SA 561, by the 
expression “some risk to life”, which means the possibility and not only the probability 
that death may result. It would be incongruous to limit a wrongdoer's constructive intent to 
cases where the result which he had foreseen was likely to cause death and not to infer such 
intent where the result he had foreseen was, although possible, not likely.’108 
 
                                                          
104 R v Thibani (see note 102) 729 - 730. 
105 R v Huebsch 1953 (2) SA 561 (A) 567. 
106 R v Nsele 1955 (2) SA 145 (A) 148. 
107 R v Horn 1958 (3) SA 457 (A) 465. 
108 Ibid 467; Burchell (see note 6) 363. (Exact quote from textbook). 
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The approach adopted in Horn was subsequently followed by our courts in later cases. In S v Mini, 
Holmes JA held that: 
‘... the only reasonable inference is that the appellant did foresee the possibility, even if 
slight, of death resulting from what he was about to do and was doing.’109 
Holmes JA in S v De Bruyn confirmed his judgment in Mini, holding that: 
‘... The accused foresees the possibility, however remote, of his act resulting in death to 
another...’110 
In S v Shaik it was held that it does not matter whether or not the accused foresaw a result thatwas 
highly improbable or unlikely.111 
In S v Ngubane, Jansen JA held that: 
‘In principle it should not matter in respect of dolus eventualis whether the agent foresees 
(subjectively) the possibility as strong or faint, as probable or improbable, provided his 
state of mind in regard to that possibility is "consenting", "reconciling" or "taking into the 
bargain". However, the likelihood in the eyes of the agent of the possibility eventuating 
must obviously have a bearing on the question whether he did "consent" to that 
possibility.’112 
From the above case law it is clear that South African courts have adopted the view that the 
cognitive element of dolus eventualis should be defined in unqualified terms. Various legal 
scholars share this view.113 
However, despite the authoritative precedent in favour of defining the cognitive element of dolus 
eventualis in unqualified terms, a further development of defining the cognitive element of dolus 
eventualis in qualified terms has also gained significant weight in many of the courts and among 
legal scholars.114 
An examination of foresight defined in qualified terms follows. 
                                                          
109 S v Mini (see note 82) 191 G-H. 
110 S v De Bruyn (see note 66) 510 G. 
111 S v Shaik and Others 1983 (4) SA 57 (A) 62 F. 
112 S v Ngubane 1985 2 All SA 340 (A) 345 F. 
113 Hoctor (see note 73) 151. 
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2.6 Foresight defined in qualified terms 
Foresight defined in qualified terms requires the accused to foresee the likelihood of the unlawful 
result ensuing. Not only must the accused subjectively foresee the unlawful result but the unlawful 
result must also be probable or likely to occur. The foresight of a possibility is supported or 
qualified by adjectives such as "real",115 "reasonable",116 "substantial",117 or even "probable."118 
The legal scholars who express the view that the cognitive element of dolus eventualis should be 
defined in qualified terms base their stand point on the criticism that the requirement of unqualified 
foresight is contrary to public policy and inconsistent with judicial practice.119 
To avoid thoughts of inconsistency, it must be noted that when describing the cognitive element 
of dolus eventualis in qualified terms, the words reasonable, real, substantial, probable or likely 
are used as equivalents to one another.120 
2.6.1 Unqualified foresight and public policy 
The use of unqualified foresight is deemed too broad and could lead to unjust results by the 
supporters of foresight being defined in qualified terms.121 Their quarrel is that foresight of even 
the slightest possibility would amount to an accused satisfying the cognitive element of dolus 
eventualis.  
Burchell and Hunt offer the following example in support of foresight defined in qualified terms. 
Consider a motorist who enters his vehicle and upon doing so foresees the possibility that he may 
harm other road users (and subsequently reconciles himself to this fact). If this unfortunate 
possibility does in fact occur, then the accused would have intent in the form of dolus eventualis 
for the harm caused to the other road user.122 
                                                          
115 S v Ostilly & others (1) 1977 (4) SA 699 (D) 728 F. 
116 R v Suleman 1960 (4) SA 645 (N) 646 H. 
117 R v Steenkamp (see note 10) 684 F-G. 
118 R v Hercules 1954 (3) SA 826 (A) 831. 
119 Hoctor (see note 73) 137-138. 
120 Ibid 144. 
121 Whiting (see note 2) 445. 
122 Hoctor (see note 73) 138. 
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It is submitted that the scenario described above would indeed have unjust results and be against 
public policy. Dolus eventualis should not apply to mere thoughts of causing harm but rather to a 
will to cause harm. However, it must be mentioned that in the above example the conative element 
of dolus eventualis is assumed to be present. 
To prove the foresight element of dolus eventualis in the above scenario would be close to 
impossible. Dolus eventualis is proved by inferential reasoning and to draw inferences from the 
thoughts of an accused without any outward conduct would not be possible. Inferential reasoning 
requires some sort of external evidence to justify a finding of the subjective state of mind.123 
The above submission aptly introduces the next reason for which legal scholars favour defining 
foresight in qualified terms. 
2.6.2 Unqualified foresight and judicial practice 
Legal scholars have opined that when the cognitive element of dolus eventualis is defined in 
unqualified terms, our courts rarely find the foresight element of dolus eventualis to be present. 
The reason for this submission is that it is difficult for a court to find, by means of inferential 
reasoning, that an accused foresaw a remote possibility. The reason for this is that remote 
possibilities are not generally supported by facts from which reliable inferences may be drawn.124 
It was previously shown that authoritative support has developed for foresight being defined in 
unqualified terms. Foresight defined in qualified terms has also established the support of South 
African courts. However, the reasoning behind the establishment of foresight defined in qualified 
terms has come under scrutiny.125 
Paizes submits that our courts have not once found dolus eventualis to be present were the accused 
foresaw a remote possibility.126 
Whiting is of the view that there is considerable inconsistency with the theoretical and the practical 
application of the cognitive element of dolus eventualis.127 
                                                          
123 Snyman (see note 10) 185. 
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125 Hoctor (see note 73) 151. 
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Paizes and Whiting both agree that courts only find dolus eventualis to be present when a real, 
substantial or reasonable possibility exists.  
Whaley submits that the cognitive element of dolus eventualis should read: "foresight of the 
probability of harm."128 
Burchell and Hunt also favour the foresight of a probability of harm. However, they submit that if 
this is not accepted by the courts then foresight of a real or substantial possibility shall suffice.129 
Amongst the legal scholars who favour the approach of defining the foresight element of dolus 
eventualis in qualified terms, it is interesting to note that Snyman,130 Paizes131 and Whiting132 do 
not exclude the foresight of a remote possibility as an option. In fact, they support the application 
of foresight defined in unqualified terms but only in exceptional circumstances. 
It is respectfully submitted that this exception is contradictory to their support of qualified 
foresight.  
Paizes and Whiting offer the following illustration in support of exceptional cases in which a 
remote possibility might suffice. 
Person X has a cabinet filled with twenty firearms. Only one of the firearms in the cabinet contains 
a bullet; the rest are blank. Person X intends to use a scare tactic on person Y by pointing a 
randomly selected firearm at person Y. Person X happens to select the firearm that is loaded and 
subsequently kills person Y. Person X foresaw that he might select the loaded firearm and kill 
person Y. He also reconciled himself to this result. Speaking as a matter of probability, there was 
a five percentage chance that person X would kill person Y.133 
                                                          
128 Whaley ‘Criminal in our courts: Dolus eventualis’ 1967 Responsa Meridiana 117: 118. 
129 Hoctor (see note 73) 139. 
130 Snyman (see note 10) 180. ‘... the more remote (or improbable) the possibility that the result might 
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The crucial question that this illustration poses is that if qualified foresight in determining the 
cognitive element of dolus eventualis were to be supported, would person X escape liability in the 
form of dolus eventualis because there was only a remote possibility that person Y would die? 134 
Legal scholars who support qualified foresight recognise that in this situation, foresight of a remote 
possibility will suffice.135 
Whiting is of the opinion that this example is one of dolus directus and not dolus eventualis. The 
reason for Whiting's submission is that person X's purpose was to expose person Y to the risk of 
death.  
It is respectfully submitted that dolus directus will only exist if person X intended to use all the 
firearms until he encountered the loaded firearm. If this was the case, then person X had a direct 
intention to kill person Y, because person X was certain that person Y would die by one of the 
firearms but was uncertain as to which specific firearm would deliver the fatal wound. The 
difference is that person X does not merely foresee the death of person Y but rather wills his death. 
It is respectfully submitted that the above illustration is an example of intention in the form of 
dolus eventualis. The reasoning adopted is that person X did not wish to kill person Y, his intention 
was to scare him. However, person X foresaw the risk of causing person Y's death and accepted 
this. Person X only wished to solicit information from person Y. However, the method by which 
he chose to solicit such information caused him to accept the possibility that he could cause the 
death of person Y.  
This illustration provides a practical scenario in which foresight of an unqualified possibility may 
suffice to satisfy the cognitive element of dolus eventualis.  
It is respectfully submitted that the South African courts have been inconsistent in applying the 
cognitive element of dolus eventualis and have fluctuated between applying qualified and 
unqualified foresight criteria.136 
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2.6.3 Case law in favour of qualified foresight 
A number of South African court judgments have supported the view that the cognitive element 
of dolus eventualis should be defined in qualified terms.137 Legal scholars have offered praise and 
criticism for judgments in support of the cognitive element of dolus eventualis in qualified 
terms.138 
Milne J in R v Steenkamp described dolus eventualis as follows. 
‘It seems to me, then, that, in so far as it is based on the wounding of the complainant, the 
conviction can only stand if it was proved that the appellant fired the shot with the specific 
intention of wounding the complainant or that, when he fired the shot, he knew that there 
was a substantial risk of his wounding the complainant and was reckless whether he 
wounded him or not.’139 
The debate between defining foresight in qualified or unqualified terms was not specifically dealt 
with in the case referred to above. However, the wording used by Milne J to describe the foresight 
element of dolus eventualis implies that foresight was defined in qualified terms.140 The use of the 
term 'substantial risk' implies something more than a remote or slight risk. 
Holmes J in R v Suleman described the cognitive element of dolus eventualis in qualified terms by 
stating that 'the accused must contemplate a reasonable possibility of the result flowing.'141 
In both Steenkamp and Suleman, the issue of the degree of foresight required was not expressly 
dealt with by the court. It is respectfully submitted that these decisions are High Court judgments 
and do not provide the authoritative stance required. It is interesting to note that the court in both 
Steenkamp and Suleman defined foresight in qualified terms despite citing Appellate Division 
cases that favoured foresight in unqualified terms.142 No explanation was provided for the court’s 
deviation from the stare decisis principle.  
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A pivotal case in the debate regarding the degree of foresight is S v Beukes en 'n ander,143 in which 
the court discussed the conative element of dolus eventualis. However, before engaging in a 
discussion of the conative element, the court commented on the cognitive element of dolus 
eventualis.144 
Van Heerden JA began by acknowledging the acceptance of foresight of a remote possibility.145 
He then spoke of both the cognitive and conative elements and stated that if an accused foresees a 
result he invariably reconciles himself to it.146 He further stated that it is rare that an accused will 
admit to foreseeing a remote possibility. The court will therefore draw an inference from the 
accused's state of mind that shows, objectively assessed, that it was reasonably possible for the 
result to occur.147 
Van Heerden JA then went on to say that the conative element of dolus eventualis is normally only 
satisfied if the accused foresees a reasonable possibility of the unlawful result occurring.148 
Legal scholars have welcomed the conclusion of Beukes insofar as it describes the cognitive 
element of dolus eventualis in qualified terms.149 However, the reasoning used by the court to 
reach this conclusion has been criticized on a number of grounds.150Firstly, Van Heerden JA's 
comment that it is easier to prove, by inferential reasoning, a reasonable possibility as opposed to 
a remote possibility, may be generally true.151 However, this illustrates an evidential obstacle and 
not a justification to favour foresight in qualified terms.152 
Secondly, Van Heerden JA is criticised for formulating an unsound connection between the 
cognitive element of dolus eventualis and the rules of inferential reasoning.153 Paizes notes that it 
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is not sufficient for the court to determine a reasonable possibility based on an objective assessment 
to conclude that the accused had subjective intent.154 
It is submitted that if the intention of Van Heerden JA was to imply that by inferential reasoning 
the court came to the conclusion that the possibility foreseen by the accused was the only 
reasonably possible result, then that interpretation is to be welcomed.155 However, if what was 
implied was that through the process of inferential reasoning it was determined that there was a 
reasonable possibility that the result would occur, then this interpretation should not be accepted.156 
The reason is that this portrays an objective rather than subjective assessment in determining 
intention. 
If the purpose in Beukes was to override the case law supporting the foresight of a remote 
possibility, why was this not done expressly?157 Also, if the purpose of Beukes was such, then why 
did Van Heerden JA comment that dolus eventualis will normally follow where the possibility 
foreseen is strong? Does this suggest that possibilities that are slighter may have application?158 
It is submitted that Beukes did not override the precedent in favour of unqualified foresight, at 
most it merely expressed the difficulty involved in proving foresight of an unqualified nature.159 
In a Namibian case, S v Van Wyk,160 Ackermann JA adopted a different interpretation of the Beukes 
judgment to that discussed above. Ackermann JA set out to discuss the degree of foresight needed 
for dolus eventualis. He cited S v Sigwhala161 as the authority for defining dolus eventualis and 
then proceeded to cite cases thatfavoured unqualified foresight.162 Ackerman JA was of the opinion 
that such a wide formulation (unqualified foresight) for the cognitive element of dolus eventualis 
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was not justified.163 He then proceeded to state that the judgment in Beukes had thus overruled 
these cases by implication.164 
According to Ackerman JA: 
‘There can, in my view, be no doubt that in this passage, and particularly by virtue of his 
repeated reference to “redelikemoontlikheid” (“reasonable possibility”), also when 
discussing the two reasons he advances for the retention of the two criteria, the learned 
Judge of Appeal lays down a test to the effect that, without proof that the actor foresaw, as 
a reasonable possibility, that the particular consequence would result, dolus eventualis 
cannot be established.’165 
In support of his conclusion, Ackermann JA cited case law in favour of qualified foresight. 
However, the cited cases were Rhodesian and three South African High Court judgments.166 
It is respectfully submitted that Ackermann JA failed to adequately provide reasons as to why he 
supported the description of foresight in qualified terms, other than stating that unqualified 
foresight was far too broad.167 
Later in S v De Ruiter, the qualified approach to foresight was followed. The court interpreted the 
Beukes judgment as follows:  
‘...the reasonableness referred to does not import an objective element into the requirement 
for intention, but indicates the basis upon which the court must draw an inference from the 
facts to establish whether the accused, who disputes having dolus eventualis, actually had 
such intent.’168 
This interpretation of Beukes reflects the evidentiary difficulty of proving foresight by inferential 
reasoning and does not constitute an overruling of foresight of an unqualified nature.169 
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The qualified approach to foresight was followed in other cases but neither of those cases justified 
their reasoning.170 
The Beukes judgment was received differently by the courts, some of which adopted the 
interpretation that Beukes overruled the use of foresight in unqualified terms and favours foresight 
in qualified terms. The other interpretation, which it is submitted is the correct interpretation, is 
that Beukes highlights the evidentiary difficulty in proving the foresight of an unqualified 
possibility by means of inferential reasoning. 
In S v Ostilly and others171 and in S v Moodie172 the court required foresight of a real possibility.  
In S v Van Aardt, qualified foresight was favoured but unqualified foresight was not overruled, by 
both the High Court and Supreme Court of Appeal.173 
The Supreme Court of Appeal cited both Sigwhala and Van Wyk,174 the former case in support of 
unqualified foresight and the latter in support of qualified foresight. The court did not address the 
conclusion reached by Ackermann JA that Beukes effectively overruled foresight of an unqualified 
nature.175 
The point of interest in Van Aardt and numerous other cases176 is that even though foresight of a 
qualified nature was favoured, foresight of an unqualified nature was not dismissed or overruled.177 
More recently Shongwe JA in S v Makgatho affirmatively laid down the position regarding the 
degree of foresight.178 Shongwe JA held as follows on an appeal against a conviction and sentence 
for murder:179 
‘A person acts with intention, in the form of dolus eventualis, if the commission of the 
unlawful act or the causing of the unlawful result is not his main aim, but he subjectively 
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foresees the possibility that in striving towards his main aim, the unlawful act may be 
committed or the unlawful result may ensue, and he reconciles himself to this possibility 
(see CR Snyman Criminal Law 5ed (2008) at 184).  
EM Burchell & PMA Hunt South African Law and Criminal Procedure [sic] (1997:131) 
said: “It is sufficient if the accused, having foreseen the real possibility of the existence of 
the circumstances in question, nevertheless persisted in his conduct irrespective of whether 
it existed or not.” 
(See also Annual Survey of South African Law (1964:73). In other words, it must be shown 
that a real – as opposed to a remote – possibility of that consequence resulting was foreseen. 
In S v Van Wyk1992 (1) SACR 147 (NmS) at 161b, Ackermann AJA expressed himself as 
follows: “I am accordingly of the view that the subjective foresight required for dolus 
eventualis is the subjective appreciation that there is a reasonable possibility that the 
proscribed consequence will ensue.” ’ 
It is thus clear from S v Makgatho that foresight of a qualified nature is necessary to satisfy the 
cognitive element of dolus eventualis. 
The decision in Makgatho has come under scrutiny by Hoctor,180 who highlighted the 
discrepancies discussed below in the reasoning of the court. 
1. The citation used by the court from the Burchell and Hunt textbook is incorrect. Professor 
Burchell was responsible for the third edition of this book in 1997 and not the late authors 
mentioned in the judgment.181Furthermore, the statement cited does not appear on page 131 of the 
text.182 
2. The Annual Survey of South African Law (1964) reference is in fact a reference to a discussion 
on the general principles of contract law.183 This statement supports a subjective approach to 
foresight but not a qualified approach to foresight, as Makgatho has chosen.184 
3.The court relies on S v Van Wyk in support of foresight of a qualified nature. However, it is 
respectfully submitted that as Van Wyk is a Namibian case, why did Makgatho not abide by the 
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stare decisis rule?185 On what basis did the court fail to apply Appellate Division and Supreme 
Court of Appeal decisions, which have expressed support for foresight defined in an unqualified 
nature?186 
4. The Van Wyk judgment relies on the Beukes judgment. Why did the court not cite Beukes?187 
5. The Makgatho judgment is then further undermined by the fact that it cites case law that favours 
foresight of an unqualified nature.188 
It is respectfully submitted that in light of the above inconsistencies in Makgatho, the judgment is 
rather unconvincing.189 
2.6.4 Assessment of the degree of foresight required for dolus eventualis 
It is submitted that foresight defined in unqualified terms is the correct approach to adopt.190 The 
reasons for this submission are discussed below. 
1. Accepting foresight in qualified terms strains both logic and language.191 Foresight is 
foresight irrespective of the degree of foresight. To find that an accused subjectively 
foresaw a possibility and to not accept such foresight because the possibility foreseen was 
unlikely definitely undermines the jurisprudential reasoning of subjective foresight.192 As 
South African criminal law subscribes to the psychological approach to crime,193 it is 
submitted that to give credence to this approach, foresight defined in unqualified terms 
should be followed.194 The reasoning behind this submission is that an accused should not 
be able to escape liability for his subjective foresight on the basis that such foresight was 
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remote or unlikely. Such a conclusion would be contrary to the psychological approach to 
crime.195 
2. Accepting foresight of a qualified nature has the potential to distort the line between 
intention and negligence.196 It is submitted that by qualifying foresight with the terms 
“reasonable,” “real,” “substantial,” or “probable” creates two issues. The first, how does a 
court accurately define the meaning of these words without placing some sort of objective 
criteria in that determination?197 By qualifying foresight one would essentially be 
comparing the accused's foresight to a standard of reasonableness, which would have the 
effect of adopting a yardstick approach to determining foresight.198 By adopting such an 
approach one would effectively be applying a test for negligence as opposed to intention.199 
Another issue that may be present is one of interpretation. The courts may differ in their 
understanding of what constitutes a reasonable, real or probable possibility, which in turn 
will place strain on the legal certainty of dolus eventualis.200 
If the cognitive element of dolus eventualis is defined in qualified terms, then the test for 
determining foresight in dolus eventualis will align too closely with the test set out in 
Kruger v Coetzee. Kruger v Coetzee sets out the test for culpa as: whether a reasonable 
person would have foreseen the reasonable possibility of his conduct injuring another 
person and causing her harm.201 It is submitted that accepting foresight of a qualified nature 
would align rather too closely with the test for negligence. It is submitted that if objective 
criteria are used to determine a subjective inquiry, we would be reverting to a similar 
approach adopted by the courts prior to 1945, which was the English law presumption that 
a person intends the probable consequences of his actions.202 
3. It is interesting to note that besides Van Wyk, no other judgment has expressly overruled 
foresight of an unqualified nature.203 In fact, certain judgments and legal scholars accept 
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the application of foresight of an unqualified nature in particular circumstances.204 It is 
submitted that the cognitive element of dolus eventualis should not consist of a qualified 
rule that caters for certain exceptions but should rather consist of an unqualified principle 
that may encompass all situations of foresight placed before it. 
Those in favour of qualified foresight may argue that unqualified foresight is far too broad 
in its scope of application.205 However, it is submitted that this will not be the case, as dolus 
eventualis is a two part inquiry and foresight is only the first part of that inquiry. An 
affirmative finding of foresight will not automatically lead to criminal liability.206 The 
conative element of dolus eventualis still needs to be proved to find the accused criminally 
liable.207 It is respectfully submitted that the controversy surrounding the cognitive element 
of dolus eventualis is in respect of issues of proof.208 Dolus eventualis is proved by means 
of inferential reasoning, as highlighted in chapter 1. A reliance on this process of reasoning 
is a difficult burden to meet.  
It is inherently difficult to prove the subjective state of mind of an accused by means of 
inferential reasoning and the burden placed on the state of proof beyond a reasonable doubt, 
is onerous.  
4. The cognitive element of dolus eventualis in principle is theoretically flawless when 
expressed in unqualified terms. The only quarrel that presents itself is that of proof. It is 
submitted that it is indeed difficult to prove by means of inferential reasoning that the 
accused foresaw a remote possibility.209 The reason for this submission is that the external 
facts upon which inferential reasoning relies are not always present. 
It is submitted that the debate surrounding the cognitive element of dolus eventualis is more an 
evidential issue than a doctrinal issue.210 The essential feature of the cognitive element of dolus 
eventualis is subjective foresight. No further qualifying terms should be added to the element of 
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dolus eventualis.211 The terms "reasonable", "real", "substantial", "probable", "remote" or "slight" 
should not feature in the definition of the cognitive element of dolus eventualis.212 
Put simply, if the accused subjectively foresaw the possibility of causing the unlawful result, then 
the accused satisfies the cognitive element of dolus eventualis.213 
2.7 The conative element of dolus eventualis 
Now that the cognitive element of dolus eventualis has been firmly established, the focus shifts 
towards the second part of the inquiry, namely the conative element of dolus eventualis. It must 
be noted that a positive finding regarding the cognitive element of dolus eventualis is a prerequisite 
to considering the conative element of dolus eventualis.214 
By implication, if it is found that the accused did not subjectively foresee the possibility of causing 
the unlawful result, then a finding of intention in the form of dolus eventualis cannot materialise. 
This does not mean that the accused will escape liability entirely, as the concept of negligence will 
then be considered.215 
The conative element of dolus eventualis requires the accused to reconcile himself to the 
possibility that he foresaw an unlawful result (in other words, the cognitive element of dolus 
eventualis).216 
The debate surrounding the conative element of dolus eventualis has been about the lack of clarity 
and practicality regarding its meaning and description. The conative element has often been 
described with various synonymous terms but despite such descriptions,217 it has lacked a 
particular meaning.218 
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It is submitted that S v Humphreys has now provided some clarity of the meaning of the conative 
element.219 
2.7.1 The development of the conative element of dolus eventualis through case law 
Before 1945 the conative element of dolus eventualis did not appear in the application thereof.220 
It is submitted that the reasons for this are that the English law presumption that people intend the 
probable consequences of their acts was followed during this period.221 Furthermore, the 
controversy surrounding the cognitive element of dolus eventualis222 has, to an extent, clouded the 
application of the conative element. Additionally, the development of dolus eventualis was not 
firmly established in South African courts during this period.223 
2.7.2 Recklessness 
In 1945 in R v Valachia, Greenberg JA held the following on a charge of murder:  
‘We may, I think, conclude from these authorities that the crime of murder will at all events 
have been committed if it be proved ... that the accused killed the deceased by an act which 
they must have known to be of such a dangerous character that death would be likely to 
result therefrom, and were reckless whether it did or did not.’224 
First, it must be noted that Greenberg JA described the cognitive element of dolus eventualis in 
qualified terms by using the term "likely to result therefrom." However, the factor of importance 
for this discussion is the use of the word "reckless." Greenberg JA gave effect to the conative 
element of dolus eventualis by stating that a person had intention in the form of dolus eventualis 
if he acted recklessly in relation to his foresight.  
Valachia is important because it is deemed to be the inception of the term ‘recklessness’ into our 
law, as this was one of the first occasions that the term was used to describe the conative element 
of dolus eventualis.225 
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Greenberg JA derived the term recklessness from s 140(b) of the Transkeian Penal Code (hereafter 
referred to as the TPC), which provides as follows: 
‘Culpable homicide becomes murder in the following cases: 
(b) If the offender means to cause the person killed any bodily injury which is known to 
the offender to be likely to cause death, and if the offender, whether he does or does not 
mean to cause death, is reckless whether death ensues or not.’226 
A number of judgments have followed Valachia and built on the interpretation by Greenberg JA.227 
For instance, in R v Thibani, Schreiner JA held: 
‘The general principle is that the Crown has to prove the intention to kill, but this expression has 
an extended or legal meaning. It covers not only a striving to achieve the actual death of the 
deceased but knowledge that the act being done is so dangerous as to be likely to cause death, 
coupled with recklessness as to whether death results or not (see Rex v Valachia and Another (1945 
AD 826 at p. 831)).’228 
R v Thibani indicates by its wording that dolus eventualis consists of two parts. The sentence 
"coupled with recklessness" suggests that recklessness is a requirement to prove dolus eventualis 
in addition to the foresight element. 
Similarly, in R v Huebsch, Schreiner JA commented in reference to Valachia and Thibani that, our 
law recognises the notion that there must be an appreciation that there is some risk to life involved 
in the action contemplated, coupled with recklessness as to whether or not the risk is fulfilled in 
death.229 
In R v Nsele, Schreiner JA held:  
‘... provided that the risk must have been, and, therefore, by inference was, present to the 
mind of the accused, and provided that he was reckless whether or not it matured in death, 
I do not think that the seriousness of the risk is material...’230 
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The above quote also illustrates that our courts have recognised that dolus eventualis is a two part 
inquiry, comprising a "foresight of risk" element and an element of "recklessness". 
In S v Mini, Holmes JA held:  
‘The proposition is well established in our law that a person has the necessary intention to 
kill if he appreciates that the injury which he intends to inflict on another may cause death 
and nevertheless inflicts that injury, reckless whether death will ensue or not.’231 
In S v De Bruyn, Holmes JA held the following on dolus eventualis:232 
‘The accused foresees the possibility, however remote, of his act resulting in death to 
another, yet he persists in it, reckless whether death ensues or not. On analysis, the multiple 
characteristics of this form of dolus are: 
1. Subjective foresight of the possibility, however remote, of his unlawful conduct causing 
death to another. 
2. Persistence in such conduct, despite such foresight. 
3. An insensitive recklessness (which has nothing in common with culpa). 
4. The conscious taking of the risk of resultant death, not caring whether it ensues or not. 
5. The absence of actual intent to kill.’ 
The comments made by Homes JA in S v De Bruyn indicate that dolus eventualis consists of two 
parts. The first is that of subjective foresight, which is expressed in unqualified terms and the 
second is that of "recklessness" or "conscious risk taking" with the former term expressly stated as 
being different from negligence. 
Jansen JA in S v Ngubane held that:  
‘The distinguishing feature of dolus eventualis is the volitional component: the agent (the 
perpetrator) "consents" to the consequence foreseen as a possibility, he "reconciles 
himself" to it, he "takes it into the bargain". Our cases often speak of the agent being 
"reckless" of that consequence, but in this context it means consenting, reconciling or 
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taking into the bargain and not the "recklessness" of the Anglo American systems nor an 
aggravated degree of negligence.’233 
Smalberger JA defined dolus eventualis with regard to the accused persons in S v Sethoga as 
follows: 
‘...they had subjective foresight of the possibility, however remote, of their unlawful 
conduct causing death to others, and persisted in such conduct with a reckless disregard of 
the possible consequences thereof (dolus eventualis).’234 
Smalberger JA again held in S v De Oliveira on a charge of murder: 
‘...he must have foreseen, and by necessary inference did foresee, the possibility of death 
ensuing to the persons outside, but reconciled himself to that event occurring. In the 
circumstances he was correctly held to have had the necessary intention to kill in the form 
of dolus eventualis.’ 235 
It is submitted that the conative element has been described differently throughout the years and 
often described synonymously with terms such as ‘recklessness’,236 ‘callous disregard’,237 
‘conscious risk taking’,238 ‘persistence regardless of whether the result occurs or not’,239 
‘indifferent to the consequences of his actions’,240 ‘foresaw into the bargain’241 and ‘consents’.242 
2.7.3 Criticism of the term recklessness and of the conative element of dolus eventualis 
Smith criticises the use of the word “recklessness” as derived from the TPC. His criticism 
highlights the fact that the term ‘recklessness’ is ambiguous in its meaning. 
The term “recklessness” was derived from the TPC, as mentioned in Valachia above. The TPC is 
a product of English law. Smith submits that according to English law, the term “recklessness” is 
commonly referred to as a type of advertent negligence.243 Smith is therefore of the view that 
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recklessness is a type of negligence that compares the accused to a standard of reasonableness.244 
Smith's interpretation differs from the approach adopted in Ngubane and De Bruyn, in which 
recklessness is expressly stated to be different from negligence. 
In R v Strydom, Dowling J held: 
‘In my opinion the intention which must be proved in an assault with intent to do grievous 
bodily harm must be proved as an actual fact, and therefore heedlessness and recklessness 
cannot, in charges of assault with intent to do grievous bodily harm, take the place of an 
actual proved intention.’245 
The term recklessness was viewed in a similar manner in S v Du Preez by Ogilvie Thompson CJ:  
‘To shoot with a pistol in the direction of a moving human being leaving so small a margin 
for safety may indeed fairly be described as reckless conduct; but reckless conduct per se 
is not necessarily to be equated with dolus eventualis.’246 
Despite Smith's criticism, he does acknowledge that recklessness has been interpreted as a state of 
mind by our courts. However, he is of the opinion that the conative element of dolus eventualis 
should be omitted from the definition of dolus eventualis and that it should consist of only the 
cognitive element defined in qualified terms.247 
More recently and in contradiction with precedent, S v Humphreys authoritatively held that the use 
of the term recklessness is incorrect when describing dolus eventualis, as it places an objective 
inquiry into the element of intention.248 Humphreys strays from the conclusion drawn in Ngubane 
and De Bruyn regarding the meaning of the term ‘recklessness’. This judgment has been subject 
to criticism and is discussed thoroughly in chapter 3.249 
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2.7.4 Is the conative element of dolus eventualis superfluous? 
There are legal scholars who hold the opinion that the conative element of dolus eventualis is 
redundant.250 Some go as far as to say that it is a notion without utility.251 It is submitted that the 
scholars who make the above submission are in favour of defining the cognitive element of dolus 
eventualis in qualified terms. 
The reasoning in support of such a submission is that if an accused subjectively foresees a "real" 
or "reasonable" or "substantial" possibility, he then also "reconciles" or "consents to the 
consequences" or "acts recklessly" with regard to that possibility.  
In addition to the above submission, case law rarely exists in which the conative element was 
called upon to determine the existence of dolus eventualis. The reasoning is that dolus eventualis 
depends on the degree of foresight.  
However, as was discussed earlier, their quarrel is one of proof and not principle.252 
It is difficult to ignore the submissions of these legal scholars but the case of S v Maritz offers an 
illustration in which the conative element found application.253 This case is one of the few that 
provide an example of the meaning of the conative element.254 
The facts of Maritz were that a man was tied by a rope to a vehicle and forced to run in front of it. 
The rope was pulled taut and the man was caught under the wheel of the vehicle, which killed him. 
The Appellate Division found the accused guilty of culpable homicide, reasoning that intention 
was lacking. The form of intention applied to these facts was dolus eventualis. The accused did 
subjectively foresee that he may cause the death of the deceased by his actions (cognitive element). 
However, the accused did not accept that this would occur, as he genuinely believed that he was 
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in control and would not let the death of the deceased materialise.255 The facts in Maritz are apt 
for a discussion of the concept of luxuria.256 
In light of the above, it is submitted that the conative element of dolus eventualis serves an 
important function and retains the subjective elements of intention. 257 
2.8 The concept of luxuria 
Luxuria is a form of negligence in South Africa criminal law that it is also known as conscious 
negligence.258 It is submitted that this form of negligence is the middle ground between intention 
(dolus eventualis) and negligence.  
Luxuria and dolus eventualis have characteristics in common. If an accused satisfies the cognitive 
element of dolus eventualisas well as the conative element, he is deemed to have intention.259 
However, if the accused satisfies the cognitive element of dolus eventualis and fails to satisfy the 
conative element, he is deemed to have acted in a state of luxuria, which is a form of negligence.260 
By means of illustration:261 
A professional sniper assumes his position and identifies his target, person X. The sniper intends 
on shooting and killing person X, however, person X is standing very close to person Y. The sniper 
foresees the possibility that he may miss his target (person X) and in fact shoot and kill person Y 
(this describes the cognitive element). In light of such foresight, the sniper truly believes that he 
will never miss his target based on the fact that he is a well renowned shot and has never missed 
before. The sniper fires the shot and misses his target (person X) and hits person Y.  
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The sniper in the above example would escape liability for murder on the basis that the conative 
element of dolus eventualis was not satisfied because he was under a genuine belief that he would 
not kill person Y.262 
Luxuria may be described as follows: when an accused foresees a result (satisfies the cognitive 
element) but does not reconcile himself to that result (does not satisfy the conative element). 
Jansen JA in Ngubane held the following, which explains the difference between dolus eventualis 
and luxuria:263 
‘A man may foresee the possibility of harm and yet be negligent in respect of that harm 
ensuing, eg by unreasonably underestimating the degree of possibility or unreasonably 
failing to take steps to avoid that possibility . . . The concept of conscious (advertent) 
negligence (luxuria) is well known on the Continent and has in recent times often been 
discussed by our writers. . . . Conscious negligence is not to be equated with dolus 
eventualis. The distinguishing feature of dolus eventualisis the volitional component: the 
agent (the perpetrator) "consents" to the consequence foreseen as a possibility, he 
"reconciles himself" to it, he "takes it into the bargain" ... It is the particular, subjective, 
volitional mental state in regard to the foreseen possibility which characterises dolus 
eventualis and which is absent in luxuria.’ 
The principle of luxuria may certainly seem to be against the views of public policy. However, it 
is submitted that as a matter of legal principle the concept is accepted. On the basis that South 
African criminal law subscribes to a psychological approach to crime and that an accused who is 
not blameworthy ought not to be punished by the criminal law. 
The Humphreys judgment provides another example of the way in which the accused acted in a 
state of luxuria in the context of a motor vehicle collision.264 
2.9 Conclusion 
Snyman's definition of dolus eventualis should be preferred by our courts as it remains neutral with 
regard to the academic debate surrounding both the cognitive and conative elements of dolus 
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eventualis. Snyman's definition defines the cognitive element in unqualified terms and avoids 
using the ambiguous term 'recklessness' in describing the conative element.  
It is submitted that the principle of dolus eventualis is a two part inquiry. The cognitive element 
ought to be defined in unqualified terms and the conative element of dolus eventualis serves an 
important function in the definition of dolus eventualis. The importance of this function is 
highlighted in cases where an accused is acting in a state of luxuria.265 
Chapter 3 discusses the judgment of the Supreme Court of Appeal in S v Humphreys and the 
significance of the conative element of dolus eventualis. 
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CHAPTER 3 
3. S v HUMPHREYS 
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter focuses on a discussion of the judgment by the Supreme Court of Appeal in S v 
Humphreys.266 This judgment has sparked both praise267 and criticism268 concerning the 
application of dolus eventualis. 
With due respect to the victims of the Humphreys incident, the manner in which the facts of this 
case unfolded are of cinematic proportions. The facts of Humphreys are presented below.269 
On 25 August 2010 in Cape Town, a minibus transporting fourteen children was struck by a train 
whilst crossing a railway track. The driver, (hereafter referred to as the accused), of the minibus 
had crossed the railway track despite the warning signs indicating that the train was approaching. 
Ten of the children were fatally injured in the collision and four sustained serious injuries.  
The events unfolded on that fatal morning in the following manner.270 
The accused had stopped behind the last vehicle in a queue of cars waiting to cross the railway 
track (the road was named Buttskop Road). The crossing was controlled by two booms, one for 
oncoming traffic and the other for forward moving traffic. The booms were positioned on different 
sides of the railway line and could be avoided, even when they are down, by moving into the lane 
intended for oncoming traffic and by then returning to the correct lane to pass the boom on the 
other side.  
There was large stop signs and other traffic signs indicating the presence of a railway track on both 
sides of the railway track. There were also large red lights facing the traffic on both sides, which 
begin flashing when a train is approaching. Subsequent to and shortly after (approximately a few 
                                                          
266 S v Humphreys (see note 7). 
267 HJ Van der Merwe ‘One moment of extreme irresponsibility: Notes and comments on Humphreys v S 
     and the volitional component of dolus eventualis in the context of dangerous or irresponsible driving’ 
     (2013) 17 Law, Democracy and Development. 
268 S Hoctor ‘Death on the Roads and Dolus Eventualis - S v Humphreys 2013 (2) SACR 1 (SCA)’ (2013) 
     1 SACJ. 
269 S v Humphreys (see note 7) para 1. 
270 Ibid para 3, 4, 5, 6. 
43 
 
seconds after the flashing red lights), the booms begin to close. Once the booms are closed, it takes 
approximately one minute for the train to reach the crossing. 
The state witnesses stated that the accused had overtaken the line of vehicles on their right-hand 
side and had approached the crossing in the lane destined for oncoming traffic. At that stage the 
red lights were already flashing, and the booms were closed. The appellant maneuvered around 
the booms and crossed the railway track and the minibus was struck on the left side, causing the 
fatalities.   
These facts gave rise to ten charges of murder and four of attempted murder in the Western Cape 
High Court. The accused was convicted as charged and sentenced to twenty years imprisonment. 
The basis for the court’s decision was that the accused had possessed intent in the form of dolus 
eventualis.271 The accused, (hereafter referred to as the appellant), appealed both conviction and 
sentence. On appeal to the Supreme Court of Appeal (SCA), the ten convictions of murder were 
set aside and replaced with ten convictions of culpable homicide and the four convictions of 
attempted murder were set aside.272 The reasoning of the SCA was that the accused had not 
possessed criminal liability in the form of intention. However, the SCA found that his conduct had 
been negligent in nature,273 hence the convictions of culpable homicide. 
3.2 The judgment of the Supreme Court of Appeal 
3.2.1 Issues other than dolus eventualis 
Before the discussion on dolus eventualis proceeds there are two other points that need to be 
addressed. 
First is the matter of the evidence. The SCA found the state witnesses to be reliable and credible 
in their testimonies. There were certain inconsistencies between the state witnesses, but these were 
declared by the court to be peripheral and immaterial.274 
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Second is the defence of sane automatism.275 The appellant claimed that from the time he had 
joined the back of the queue at the railway crossing he could not remember anything, implying 
that he had suffered amnesia in respect of what happened thereafter. The appellant’s contention 
was that the state had failed to prove intention for the reasons provided below:276 
‘When the appellant made the U-turn [in Buttskop Road] he must have realised that the 
level crossing danger lights were activated and that the booms were closing. If the actions 
of the appellant were conscious and deliberate he would have realised the dangers involved, 
as he was a railway worker. Therefore, it is submitted that it is highly improbable that his 
actions were conscious and deliberate. It was a suicidal movement which, it is submitted, 
no reasonable person would have made if he was conscious of his actions.’ 
This submission was described by the court as confused reasoning and alleges that the appellant 
did not act consciously. If this was so, then the defence available to the appellant would be that his 
actions were not voluntary. If the submission of the appellant is that he acted involuntarily, then 
the defence available to him would be sane automatism. 
It is a trite principle in our law that the state has to prove all the elements of the crime beyond a 
reasonable doubt. However, when the defence of sane automatism is raised, the state is assisted by 
the inference that a person who commits a criminal act does so consciously and voluntarily.277 The 
onus is then shifted onto the accused to prove that they acted involuntarily.278 
For the appellant to be successful with such a defence, he would have had to set out a factual 
foundation for his reliance on such a defence.279 
The court rejected the possibility of this defence by finding that the accused had not laid a factual 
foundation to rely on the defence of sane automatism. It therefore found that he had acted 
voluntarily.280The court stated that the appellant may have been suffering from retrograde amnesia 
rather than amnesia associated with a person who had acted as an automaton. 281 
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Once it was established that the accused had acted voluntarily, the element of intention was up for 
discussion.  
3.2.2 Dolus eventualis 
The question that faced the court was, did the appellant have the necessary intention to cause the 
death of the ten passengers and attempt to cause the death of the four other passengers? The SCA 
agreed with the Western Cape High Court that the appellant had not desired to cause death or harm 
to his passengers, therefore ruling out that he had intent in the form of dolus directus.282 
The Western Cape High Court however found that the appellant had had intention in the form of 
dolus eventualis to bring about the deaths and injuries to his passengers. This was the issue that 
the SCA sought to examine on appeal.  
3.2.2.1 The definition of dolus eventualis in Humphreys 
Brand JA first sought to define the principle of dolus eventualis when he stated the following: 
‘In accordance with trite principles, the test for dolus eventualis is twofold: (a) did the 
appellant subjectively foresee the possibility of the death of his passengers ensuing from 
his conduct; and (b) did he reconcile himself with that possibility (see eg. S v De Oliveira 
1993 (2) SACR 59 (A) at 65ij).Sometimes the element in (b) is described as ‘recklessness’ 
as to whether or not the subjectively foreseen possibility ensues (see eg S v Sigwahla1967 
(4) SA 566 (A) at 570).’283 
Brand JA seems to have adopted the definition of dolus eventualis proposed by Snyman.284 It is 
submitted that praise is due for the use of this definition, as the description by Snyman remains 
neutral on both the cognitive and conative elements of dolus eventualis.285 
Furthermore, the court has defined element (a), which is the cognitive element, in unqualified 
terms by only referring to the "possibility" of harm arising.  
                                                          
282 Ibid para 12. 
283 Ibid para 12. 
284 Snyman (see note 10) 178. 
285 Hoctor (see note 73) 146. Snyman's definition remains neutral on both the cognitive and conative 
     element. 
46 
 
However, six days later the Supreme Court of Appeal in the Makgatho judgment seems to 
contradict the definition offered in Humphreys by requiring foresight of a qualified possibility.286 
3.2.2.2 The cognitive element of dolus eventualis in Humphreys 
The SCA then discussed element (a), the cognitive element.287 
The court emphasised that the foreseen possibility must be subjectively and not objectively 
determined. If the appellant’s foresight was compared with that of a reasonable person, that would 
amount to negligence and not intention.288 
The court also warned against using the process of deductive reasoning, which states that the 
appellant should have foreseen the possibility of harm arising and therefore did foresee the 
possibility.289 The result of this line of reasoning is to obscure the distinction between negligence 
and intention, as illustrated in chapter 1.  
The court then held that the correct approach to adopt in determining subjective foresight is the 
process of inferential reasoning, which is proved by drawing inferences from common human 
experience and consideration of the facts and circumstances of the case.290 
After setting out the manner in which foresight ought to be determined, Brand JA then said the 
following:291 
‘...the appellant subjectively foresaw the death of his passengers as a possible consequence 
of his conduct. I do not believe this conclusion can be faulted. I think it can confidently be 
accepted that no person in their right mind can avoid recognition of the possibility that a 
collision between a motor vehicle and an oncoming train may have fatal consequences for 
the passenger of the vehicle. Equally obvious, I think, would be the recognition on the part 
of every person that the heedless disregard of clear warning signals of an approaching train, 
together with the deliberate avoidance of a boom specifically aimed at preventing traffic to 
enter a railway crossing by reason of the approaching train, may result in a collision with 
that train.’ 
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It is submitted that praise is due for the manner in which the court determined the cognitive element 
of dolus eventualis. The distinction between intention and negligence remained clear and the 
subjectivity of the process intact. 
3.2.2.3 The conative element of dolus eventualis in Humphreys 
The court then discussed element (b), the conative element of dolus eventualis.292 Earlier the SCA 
had mentioned that the term recklessness is used to describe the conative element, but the use of 
this word leads to confusion.293 
The SCA began its discussion by citing the following passage from S v Ngubane:294 
‘A man may foresee the possibility of harm and yet be negligent in respect of that harm 
ensuing, e.g. by unreasonably underestimating the degree of possibility or unreasonably 
failing to take steps to avoid that possibility . . . The concept of conscious (advertent) 
negligence (luxuria) is well known on the Continent and has in recent times often been 
discussed by our writers. . . . Conscious negligence is not to be equated with dolus 
eventualis. The distinguishing feature of dolus eventualis is the volitional component: the 
agent (the perpetrator) "consents" to the consequence foreseen as a possibility, he 
"reconciles himself" to it, he "takes it into the bargain". . . . Our cases often speak of the 
agent being "reckless" of that consequence, but in this context it means consenting, 
reconciling or taking into the bargain . . . and not the "recklessness" of the Anglo American 
systems nor an aggravated degree of negligence. It is the particular, subjective, volitional 
mental state in regard to the foreseen possibility which characterises dolus eventualis and 
which is absent in luxuria.’ 
The SCA then held that the Western Cape High Court had formulated the test for dolus eventualis 
in relation to the appellant as: 
‘The question is, therefore, whether it had been established that the appellant reconciled 
himself with the consequences of his conduct which he subjectively foresaw. The court a 
quo held that he did. But I have difficulty with this finding. It seems to me that the court a 
quo had been influenced by the confusion in terminology against which Jansen JA sounded 
a note of caution in Ngubane. That much appears from the way in which the court 
formulated its finding on this aspect, namely – freely translated from Afrikaans – that the 
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appellant, ‘appreciating the possibility of the consequences nonetheless proceeded with his 
conduct, reckless as to these consequences.’295 
Brand JA had difficulty in accepting the use of the word reckless and said the following:296 
‘Once the second element of dolus eventualis is misunderstood as the equivalent of 
recklessness in the sense of aggravated negligence, a finding that this element had been 
established on the facts of this case, seems inevitable. By all accounts the appellant was 
clearly reckless in the extreme. But, as Jansen JA explained, this is not what the second 
element entails. The true enquiry under this rubric is whether the appellant took the 
consequences that he foresaw into the bargain; whether it can be inferred that it was 
immaterial to him whether these consequences would flow from his actions.’ 
With regard to the above reasoning the SCA held that the appellant had not reconciled himself to 
the possibility of causing the deaths of the passengers for the two reasons297 presented below. 
1. Common sense dictates that for the accused to foresee the death of his passengers he would 
have also had to foresee his own death as a possibility of the collision. It was held by the 
court that the appellant had not contemplated his own death into the bargain nor was there 
any indication that the accused had been indifferent towards his possible death.298 
In simpler terms, the court held that the accused had not reconciled himself to the possibility of 
causing the death of his passengers because for him to have done so he would have had to reconcile 
himself with his own death in the situation and the court found no evidence that the accused had 
valued his life less than that of the passengers. 
2. The appellant was under a false confidence that he would have successfully avoided the 
collision with the train.299 The court arrived at this conclusion because the appellant had 
successfully performed this dangerous manoeuvre on two previous occasions.300 In 
addition to the appellant’s false confidence, the dangerous manoeuvre which the appellant 
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had performed was practically possible to execute as the train took one minute to arrive 
once the booms had closed.301 
3.3 Assessment of the court's reasoning with regard to the conative element 
There are three points that warrant discussion under this element. Firstly, the SCA's rejection of 
the term "recklessness". Secondly, the first reason the court held that the accused failed to satisfy 
the conative element of dolus eventualis and thirdly, the second reason the court held that the 
appellant failed to satisfy the conative element. 
First, the rejection of the word "recklessness". Hoctor criticises the court’s rejection of the term 
"recklessness" when describing the conative element.302 The reason for his criticism is that the 
court equated recklessness to advertent negligence.303 The court reached its conclusion on this 
aspect by citing from the Ngubane judgment.304 However, in examining the comment of Jansen 
JA in Ngubane, it is evident that the term ‘recklessness’ is used to describe a state of mind that is 
subjective and not a level of negligence.305 
It is submitted that all Jansen JA attempts to warn us of is the ambiguity in the meaning of the 
word “recklessness”. This is the same contention made by Smith, who states that the term 
“recklessness” is derived from English law and imports objective elements into a subjective 
inquiry.306 
It is submitted that the views expressed by Smith and Brand JA in respect of the use of the term 
“recklessness” have merit. If we examine the origin of the word recklessness, it is derived from s 
140(b) of the TPC, which is a document that was written by an English judge and first used in R v 
Valachia.307 
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Since Valachia,308 the term “recklessness” has been followed in subsequent Appellate Division 
cases.309 
In light of the criticism of the term “recklessness”, it is submitted that the term has been interpreted 
and applied differently than in the English law sense310 and therefore the reasoning for which the 
court in Humphreys has favoured an alternate interpretation is rather unconvincing.311 
The second point of discussion is the first reason of the court, which was that the appellant was 
lacking the conative element as he failed to reconcile himself to his own death occurring in the 
collision. It is submitted that the court correctly assumed that the appellant and the passengers 
were subjected to the same fate when the train struck the minibus.312 It is presumed that the court 
arrived at this conclusion based on the fact that the appellant and the deceased were all in the same 
vehicle. It is submitted that this reasoning is satisfactory and that if a particular person were to 
survive the collision it would be a matter of fortune rather than calculated malice.  
It is submitted that the court's reasoning is based on a logical presupposition. If all the people inside 
the vehicle are subject to the same fate, then it is sufficient for the accused to foresee the 
death/injury of anyone of the people inside the vehicle to satisfy the cognitive element of dolus 
eventualis. It does not matter whose death he foresaw. The fact that he had not foreseen his own 
death meant that he had not foreseen the death of the other people in the vehicle.   
It is submitted that the more correct question to ask in this scenario would be, did the accused 
foresee the death of any of the occupants in the motor vehicle, including himself? 
Hoctor disagrees with the court's reasoning and offers the following illustration in support of his 
view:313 
A person is ascending a blind rise in his vehicle whilst stuck behind a slow-moving truck. 
Frustrated with his slow progress he chooses to overtake the truck despite the foresight that there 
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may well be oncoming traffic. By swerving into the path of such oncoming traffic in order to 
overtake the truck, he may cause a collision that may fatally wound the occupants of the other 
vehicle. Where the driver nevertheless decides to take the risk of the collision occurring, overtaking 
in the face of such foresight, and the foreseen collision takes place with fatal consequences for the 
occupants of the oncoming vehicle, such driver may be held liable for murder on the basis of dolus 
eventualis. What if in deciding to take the risk the driver foresees that the overtaking manoeuvre 
could cause his own death if a collision were to take place but discounts the possibility of this 
occurring? Does his discounting of the foresight of his own possible death exclude his liability for 
the foreseen death of the occupants of the other vehicle? It should certainly not do so. Whatever 
his own belief about what may happen to him, the critical consideration for the purposes of 
criminal liability for harm caused to others is the accused's mental state in respect of such harm to 
others. 
However, it is submitted that the facts in the illustration offered by Hoctor differ substantially from 
the situation posed in Humphreys, as both the accused and the deceased are in the same vehicle in 
the latter case. The people inside that vehicle are subjected to the same fate, which is why the court 
in Humphreys inquired into whether or not the accused foresaw his own death. It is therefore 
respectfully submitted that the criticism offered by Hoctor does not have relevance in the 
Humphreys scenario. 
It is submitted that the first reason of the court is logical and sound. For the accused to have 
reconciled himself to the death of his passengers he would have had to have reconciled himself to 
his own death, which he did not do. Therefore, reconciliation of death did not occur in the mind of 
the accused. 
Thirdly, it is submitted that the second reason of the court is on much firmer ground, which was 
that the accused failed to reconcile himself to the death of his passengers because he was acting 
under a sense of false confidence.314 The SCA held that the appellant had acted under a sense false 
confidence that he would successfully cross the railway track.  
The court based its conclusion that the accused was acting under a sense of false confidence on 
the fact that the appellant had successfully executed the same manoeuvre on two previous 
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occasions.315 Furthermore, the court held that the manoeuvre was practically possible to perform 
because the train took about one minute to reach the crossing once the booms closed.316 The false 
confidence was that the accused genuinely believed that he would not cause any harm from his 
actions due to his past experiences performing the same manoeuvre. 
The issues that arise as a result of the SCA finding that the accused had a false sense of confidence 
are obvious. How does one establish the existence of such a false sense of confidence?  
One would assume that the court would draw inferences from the circumstances and consider the 
facts that would influence the subjective state of mind of the accused. In light of the inferences 
drawn, the court will have to exercise its discretion as to whether it believes that the accused had 
indeed acted with false confidence.  
It is submitted that the SCA in Humphreys correctly found that the accused was acting under a 
false sense of confidence. The process of proving intention by means of inferential reasoning is a 
subjective inquiry. It is submitted that the SCA in Humphreys correctly applied the process of 
inferential reasoning and retained the subjective nature of the inquiry. The court took into account 
all the circumstances relevant to the accused’s state of mind and avoided an armchair approach to 
determining intention. 
However, does this notion of a "false sense of confidence" create a dangerous precedent for 
irresponsible and hazardous drivers?  
Consider the person who often texts while driving on a freeway with fast moving traffic. If the 
person eventually causes an accident and kills someone, does this mean that because of their 
previous success they would escape liability in the form of intention, justified by the reasoning 
that they were acting under a false sense confidence? 
It is submitted that this example may seem theoretically possible. However, the crucial aspect in 
establishing a sense of false confidence would be a question of evidence. In Humphreys the 
evidence given was sufficient to firmly establish his defence.  
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3.4 Conclusion  
It is submitted that the Humphreys judgment warrants praise, as it reinforces the subjective 
approach to determining the presence of the element of intention and is in accord with the 
psychological approach to crime.  
It is submitted that it would be absurd to find the accused guilty of murder in the circumstances of 
Humphreys. The only way the accused could have been properly convicted of murder in this 
scenario would be if he had intended to kill himself and his passengers but had miraculously 
survived the collision. However, in the circumstances of this case, it could not be that the accused 
had foreseen the possibility of the death of his passengers but had excluded himself from that 
possibility. It is therefore submitted that, based on a correct interpretation of the legal principle of 
dolus eventualis, the SCA rightly overturned the appellant’s convictions of murder and replaced 
them with convictions of culpable homicide. 
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CHAPTER 4 
4. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
4.1 Findings on dolus eventualis 
Paizes is correct in describing dolus eventualis as one of the most fundamental principles in South 
African criminal law.317Dolus eventualis is a form of intention that broadens the scope of intention 
in South African criminal law. It allows for criminal liability to be proven without there being 
direct intention that an accused committed an unlawful act.318 As discussed in Chapter 1, direct 
intention is not always present and if our legal system were to rely solely on direct evidence, our 
prosecution system would find it difficult to secure convictions based on intention.319 
The legal principle of dolus eventualis has developed since the 13th century and moved further 
away from its objective nature towards a more subjective approach to assessing dolus eventualis.320 
In respect of the debate surrounding the definition of dolus eventualis, it is submitted that dolus 
eventualis is best described as a two part inquiry containing both a cognitive and conative element.  
In respect of the cognitive element, it is submitted that the inquiry ought to be defined in 
unqualified terms, as discussed in chapter 2. The recent approach adopted in S v Makgatho, which 
defines dolus eventualis in qualified terms, should not be followed.321 The approach followed in 
Makgatho adds objective criteria into the cognitive element of dolus eventualis, as highlighted in 
chapter 2. Such objective criteria are unsatisfactory and an incorrect application of dolus 
eventualis. Furthermore, using objective criteria to determine dolus eventualis disregards the 
psychological approach to crime.   
With regard to the conative element, it is submitted that the approach adopted by the SCA in S v 
Humphreys is the correct approach to follow. The rejection of the word “recklessness” by the court 
is welcomed on the basis that the word has introduced ambiguity into our law that has caused 
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confusion within the conative element of dolus eventualis.322 Grammatical precision is required 
when applying dolus eventualis and the word “recklessness” does not assist in providing clarity of 
the conative element. A lack of clarity has the potential to blur the distinction between intention 
and negligence.  
4.2 Findings on dolus eventualis in the context of motor vehicle collisions 
It is submitted that dolus eventualis may apply in the context of motor vehicle collisions. However, 
a finding of intention in these circumstances deserves critical scrutiny and consideration. Dolus 
eventualis applied to motor vehicle collisions that cause death are considerably different from 
dolus eventualis in respect of deaths caused by other unlawful acts. The difference is that in motor 
vehicle scenarios the accused is performing a social utility, (driving a motor vehicle), which 
involves no initial unlawful conduct or intention. In scenarios of murder committed by the use of 
a firearm or weapon, the unlawfulness of the act is present even before the unlawful killing occurs.  
It is submitted that to find that ordinary motorists have the intent to kill other road users in the 
form of dolus eventualis tarnishes the seriousness of this form of intention. South Africa subscribes 
to the psychological approach to crime,323 which attaches criminal liability in accordance with the 
level of blameworthiness of the accused. It is therefore rather difficult to accept that ordinary 
motorists who cause fatalities as a result of their driving could be labeled as intentional killers. 
Fatalities that arise from motor vehicle collisions stress the importance of the conative element of 
dolus eventualis. On this basis, the concept of luxuria is important in the context of motor vehicle 
collisions. It is submitted that the legal concept of luxuria needs to be expressly discussed by our 
courts when discussing the concept of dolus eventualis. The concept of luxuria may assist a court 
in determining whether or not an accused has satisfied the conative element of dolus eventualis. 
The only difference between dolus eventualis and luxuria is that in the former form of culpability 
the conative element is proven to be present and, in the latter, the conative element is absent. 
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The principle of luxuria involves the foresight of a possibility (cognitive element) but lacks the 
reconciliation of such foresight (conative element). The difference between dolus eventualis and 
luxuria therefore lies within the conative element.  
The judgments of S v Maritz and S v Humphreys both illustrate practical examples of how an 
accused may foresee a possibility of causing a fatality and still not reconcile himself to the fact 
that such a possibility may materialise. The accused is therefore not acting with intention in the 
form of dolus eventualis but rather acting negligently in the form of luxuria. 
A finding of intention in the form of dolus eventualis relies on inferential reasoning.324 For an 
inference to be drawn from the facts, such an inference must be the only reasonable inference that 
can be drawn from those facts.325 Proving that an accused drove a motor vehicle with the intent to 
kill will be difficult to do without knowledge of the events that transpired inside the motor vehicle. 
The outward movements of the motor vehicle may indicate a dangerous and irresponsible driver, 
however, this could be incorrect, as the accused may have simply lost control of the motor vehicle 
for reasons beyond his control.  
Drawing inferences in this context may not be sufficient evidence to find that the accused had 
acted intentionally. The SCA in Humphreys deserves praise for the manner in which it subjectively 
assessed the state of mind of the accused. The reasoning in Humphreys avoided objective criteria 
and standards. 
4.3 Recommendations 
The increase in the number of fatalities experienced on South African roads is of serious 
concern.326 However, it is submitted that enforcing harsher convictions on road users who cause 
such fatalities is not the correct approach to reducing the number of road fatalities. In fact, such an 
approach tampers with the principle of dolus eventualis. The National Prosecuting Authority may 
be pressured into initiating charges of murder in circumstances that do not warrant such a charge 
and as a result, judgments may be delivered that reflect the incorrect application of the principle 
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of dolus eventualis. The principle of dolus eventualis should not be tampered with to gain a 
political advantage.  
Dolus eventualis may apply in the context of motor vehicle collisions.327 However, the chances of 
its success are rare and largely dependent on the inferences that can be drawn from the available 
evidence. 
The success of dolus eventualis is dependent on the inferences that may be drawn in the 
circumstances. In the Humphreys scenario, it was highly unlikely for the charge of murder to 
succeed based on intention in the form of dolus eventualis, as the accused and the deceased persons 
were all in the same vehicle. To find that the accused had the intention to kill the deceased persons 
would logically imply that the accused had intended to bring about his own death as well, unless 
the contrary can be proven. 
It is respectfully submitted that the National Prosecuting Authority should be hesitant in charging 
motorists who cause fatalities as a result of motor vehicle collisions with murder, as it is 
questionable if such accused persons had the intention to kill. It is submitted that their actions fall 
short of being intentional in the eyes of the law and are much better described as a type of 
aggravated negligence. Verdicts of culpable homicide with aggravated sentences based on the 
principle of luxuria may be a more suitable punishment and deterrent to other dangerous motorists. 
Applying the concept of luxuria to the drivers who cause fatalities from motor vehicle collisions 
is the more legally correct approach for the National Prosecuting Authority to adopt than pursuing 
charges of murder based on dolus eventualis. 
The conduct of an accused person in the context of motor vehicle collisions is certainly 
inconsiderate, dangerous and irresponsible. However, it may be incorrect to find that their conduct 
was intentional in the eyes of the law. They may well be acting in a state of luxuria. 
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